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Abstract
Ameasure of good and bad is internal to something falling under it when that thing
falls under the measure in virtue of what it is. The concept of an internal standard
has broad application. Compare the external breed standards arbitrarily imposed
at a dog show with the internal standards of health at work in the veterinarian’s
office. This paper is about practical standards, measures of acting well and badly,
and so measures deployed in deliberation and choice. More specifically, it is
about the attempt to explain the unconditional validity of certain norms (say, of
justice and prudence) by showing them to be internal to our agency and the causality
it involves. This is constitutivism. Its most prominent incarnations share a set of
assumptions about the nature of agency and our knowledge of it: conceptualism,
formalism and absolutism. This essay investigates the merits and viability of rejecting
all of them while still seeking the ground of practical normativity in what we are, in
our fundamental activity.
1. Introduction: reason and will
We all know Hume says,
the impulse [to pursue a certain object] arises not from reason, but is only di-
rected by it… Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions1
whereas Kant says,
the true vocation of reasonmust be to produce awill that is good, not simply as
a means to other purposes, but in itself.2
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They are commonly taken to be in a dispute about the role of reason in
practice: whether this consists merely in determining means suitable
to ends given from elsewhere, or also, andmore fundamentally, in de-
termining what ends to be pursued. How do we adjudicate such a
dispute? When one party claims that rational reflection can and
should play only an instrumental role in deliberation, while another
claims that it can and should determine what ends are to be
pursued, where do we look to figure out who is right?
An influential body of work in contemporary ethics and practical
reason proposes that the dispute can be resolved by reflecting the
nature of agency. The idea is that we might establish the authority
of certain practical requirements – perhaps only conditional require-
ments between ends and means, or perhaps unconditional require-
ments on our ends themselves – by deriving them from the the very
idea of agency. Seen through this lens, the dispute between Hume
and Kant is about whether an agent, considered simply as such, is
subject only to requirements to take means conducive to its ends,
or whether it must also be subject to further, substantive require-
ments on the ends it pursues. The dispute, in other words, concerns
what standards of correctness in practical thought, or measures of
acting well, belong internally or constitutively to the power to act.
On one widespread conception, constitutivism is the project of de-
fending a thesis of precisely this sort: a thesis that basic practical re-
quirements are grounded in the nature of action.3 Constitutivists
typically argue, in addition, that fundamental practical principles
can only be validated in this way – that an agent could shrug off
without inconsistency any requirement that could not be traced
back to the very nature of agency. Even in the absence of such an ar-
gument, this way of understanding the authority of a standard of
action has obvious appeal. If it could be shown that any agent is,
by nature, subject to certain requirements, this would elegantly
clarify why we, who know ourselves to act intentionally, must (in
some sense) know ourselves to be bound by them. And if there
were such a proof, it would provide a particularly attractive sort of
vindication: it would show them to be objective, while at the same
3 Thus in an article summarising the current discussion, Elijah
Millgram writes ‘[c]onstitutivist arguments move from the premises that
anything you do will inevitably be an action, and that an action is such-
and-such, to the conclusions that whatever you do will be a such-and-
such’ Elijah Millgram, ‘Pluralism About Action’, in A Companion to the
Philosophy of Action, ed. Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 90.
time illuminating why they are such as to immediately engage the will
of each (perhaps not always, but when we deliberate without interfer-
ence). It would thus avoid a familiar dilemma: the apparent need to
choose between views which vindicate the objectivity of standards
of action in a way that leaves a residual mystery about how they
might make a dent on the will, and views which explain the immedi-
ate bearing of normative thought to move us to act onmotivation, but
in a way that deprives them of objectivity. Even if some philosophers
have given up one or the other, they have done so under the pressure
of the difficulty. The natural first response is to seek an account that
shows the incompatibility to be merely apparent.
Can the concept of action bear the theoretical weight constitutivists
place on it? One ground for skepticism is that different constitutivists
come to such strikingly different conclusions about which require-
ments are built into the structure of agency. Humeans insist that
only hypothetical requirements to take appropriate means to one’s
actual ends, whatever they may be, can be part of this structure.4
Kantians maintain, on the other hand, that being subject to categor-
ical requirements on ends is a condition of the possibility of being an
agent at all.5 There is reason to worry that intuitions about the re-
quirements contained in the concept of agency simply reflect sub-
stantive convictions about the normative requirements to which we
are subject, and cannot supply an independent point of leverage on
the latter question. Moreover, even if it were shown that, on some
4 James Dreier, ‘Humean Doubts About the Practical Justification of
Morality’, in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Gaut
Berys (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 81–100; Sharon Street, ‘What Is
Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?’ Philosophy Compass 5(5)
(2010): 363–84; Sharon Street, ‘Coming to Terms with Contingency:
Humean Constructivism About Practical Reason’, in Constructivism in
Practical Philosophy, ed. Jimmy Lenman and Yonatan Shemmer (Oxford
University Press, 2012); Candace A. Vogler, Reasonably Vicious (Harvard
University Press, 2002).
5 Christine M. Korsgaard, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and
Integrity (Oxford University Press, 2009); Christine M. Korsgaard, The
Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology
(Oxford University Press, 2008); Sebastian Rödl, Self-Consciousness
(Harvard University Press, 2007). Michael Smith, ‘The Magic of
Constitutivism’, American Philosophical Quarterly 52(2) (2015); Michael
Smith, ‘A Constitutivist Theory of Reasons: Its Promise and Parts’, Law,
Ethics and Philosophy 1(0) (2013): 9–30; David J. Velleman, The Possibility
of Practical Reason (Oxford University Press, 2000), and How We Get
Along (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
conception of agency, being an agent involves being bound by certain
principles, it might still be asked what reason there is to be an agent in
the relevant sense. A number of critics have argued that, in the absence
of an answer, a putative derivation of normative requirements from
the concept of agency cannot show them to be unconditionally
binding. And, the critics add, answering this question requires ap-
pealing to a source of normativity other than, or external to, agency
itself, and so the constitutivist program simply cannot succeed.6
2. Three assumptions about constitutivism
The aim of the present essay is to raise some questions about a set of
assumptions accepted by all the parties to this dispute – Kantians,
Humeans and their rationalist critics. They assume that an adequate
constitutivist account must meet the following conditions:
Conceptualism: It must show certain requirements on action to be analytic-
ally contained in the very concept of agency, a concept that applies to all subjects
capable of acting for reasons, however different they may otherwise be.
Formalism: It must show how to derive the relevant substantive requirements
from a conception of agency, in such a way that a subject who was skeptical of
them, but who understood himself to be an agent in the relevant sense, and was
capable of appreciating what this implies, would be compelled to accept the re-
quirements on pain of inconsistency.
Absolutism: It must show that certain normative requirement hold for all pos-
sible agents-capable-of-acting-for-reasons. If a kind of rational agent which is
not subject to these requirements were shown to be possible, the relevant con-
stitutivist project would be shown to be a failure.
These assumptions are closely related. Someone who accepts
Conceptualism must accept both Formalism and Absolutism, and
while a commitment to Formalism or Absolutism may not strictly
imply the others, it certainly makes them natural to think. In any
6 David Enoch, ‘Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come
from What Is Constitutive of Action’, The Philosophical Review 115(2)
(2006): 169–98; Elijah Millgram, ‘Practical Reason and the Structure of
Actions’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008; Peter Railton, ‘On
the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning About Belief and
Action’, in Ethics and Practical Reason, 53–79; T. M. Scanlon, ‘The
Appeal and Limits of Constructivism’, in Constructivism in Practical
Philosophy; R. Jay Wallace, ‘Constructivism About Normativity: Some
Pitfalls’, in Constructivism in Practical Philosophy.
case, my project here is not to address subtle issues about the logical
relations between these commitments, but to ask whether any should
be accepted.
I raise this question from a standpoint deeply sympathetic to the
spirit of constitutivism. I think it is right to see the debate between
Hume and Kant as a debate about the kinds of practical requirement
to which we are subject in virtue of our capacity to act for reasons.
And I agree that understanding the basis of practical normativity in
this way would provide a particularly elegant and attractiveway of ad-
dressing various basic problems in ethics and meta-ethics. My aim is
to show that the project of constitutivism can be understood more
broadly than its contemporary advocates and opponents typically
assume, a way that retains its deepest attractions, while avoiding
various difficulties that beset itsmost prominent contemporary incar-
nations. If I am right, there is room for a pluralist, non-formalist con-
stitutivism that that does not seek to ground normative requirements
on action in the sheer concept of rational agency, but that still presents
appealing and distinctive responses to fundamental questions in
ethical theory. Moreover, seeing this possibility will shed a revealing
light on the debate between Hume and Kant, and the kind of reso-
lution it might admit.
My conviction that such a view is possible grows out of reflection
on Aristotelian ethics. Contemporary discussions of constitutivism
seldom mention Aristotle and the kind of naturalism he espouses,
but he surely deserves to count as a constitutivist in some important
sense.7 His view is, famously, that the fundamental norms governing
how to lead our lives are grounded in the fact that we have by nature a
certain ergon or characterisitic activity, and that the structure of the
human soul implies a certain appropriate division of labor in how
do what it is our to do. Thus, for Aristotle, the notion of the nature
of a human being plays a crucial role in explaining practical normativ-
ity, or again the good in action: the fact that we, human beings, act
well in doing in certain ways is grounded, ultimately, in what we es-
sentially are, where this is characterised in terms of what we
7 I do not mean to say Aristotle goes entirely unmentioned. See, for
example, Stephen Engstrom, ‘The Complete Object of Practical
Knowledge’, in The Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant, ed. Joachim
Aufderheide and Ralf M. Bader (Oxford University Press, 2015), 129–57;
Christine M. Korsgaard, ‘Aristotle’s Function Argument’, in The
Constitution of Agency and ‘How to be an Aristotelian Kantian
Constitutivist’ (unpublished).
essentially do, our characteristic activity.8 In this sense, Aristotle
holds that the norms to which we are subject are constitutive norms.
It seems, however, that his conception of our constitution, of what
we are, includes more than the mere fact that we are capable of
acting for reasons: he locates the ground of the practical norms to
which we are subject, not in our nature as agents, but in our nature
as human beings, a certain kind of material being. Moreover, he dis-
plays a striking lack of concern with the task of showing that the rele-
vant norms apply to all possible agents, still less with the task of
deriving the relevant norms from some abstract or formal character-
ization of our nature. He famously says that he aims to speak only to
persons who have received a sort of upbringing that already equips
them to see the point of certain ways of acting, and he seems to
allow for the possibility that different life-forms might imply differ-
ent lists of ethical virtues. I think these features of Aristotle’s project
are not simply independent commitments, but expressions of a single
underlying idea – hylomorphism, to give it a name. A central aim in
what follows is to bring out the bearing of this idea on the contempor-
ary debate about constitutivism.
3. Absolutist constitutivism: Kantians and anti-Kantians
3.1. Kantian absolutism
It is a brute but inescapable fact that human beings confront the
question how to act. We can deliberate about what speaks in favor
of acting one way or another another, but the question whether to
be agents at all seems not to be one we can coherently regard as
open to deliberation. Christine Korsgaard puts the point this way:
Human beings are condemned to choice and action. Maybe you think you can
avoid it, by resolutely standing still, refusing to act, refusing to move. But it’s
no use, for that will be something you have chosen to do, and then you will
have acted after all…Youhave no choice but to choose, and to act on your choice.9
Absolutist constitutivists seek to ground practical normativity on this
fixed point. If it could be shown that certain normative requirements
on action are implied by the very exercise of agency, then, they argue,
these requirements would be shown to be inescapable in a special and
8 Aryeh Kosman, The Activity of Being: An Essay on Aristotle’s
Ontology (Harvard, 2013).
9 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 1.
interesting sense. For we would be committed to them, not in a
manner conditional on our having one or another end, but uncondi-
tionally, insofar as we act in pursuit of any end whatsoever.
Normative requirements grounded in the nature of agency would
thus be unconditional requirements on action.
Kant’s Groundwork is a principal source of inspiration for absolut-
ist constitutivism. On an influential interpretation, Kant there seeks
to prove that a certain fundamental norm governing action, the cat-
egorical imperative, is implicit in the very idea of a will, conceived
a capacity to determine oneself to act on the basis of reasons.
Kantian constitutivists seek to defend some version of this claim,
and thus to vindicate the idea that there are requirements to which
we are subject unconditionally, simply as rational agents. Anti-
Kantian constitutivists deny that any unconditional practical require-
ments can bewrung from the sheer idea of rational agency.Many stop
short of Hume’s conclusion that there can be no rational basis for as-
sessing our ultimate ends, but theymaintain, in any case, that the very
idea of a capacity to act for reasons cannot be the source of the norms
governing such an assessment. Surveying this dispute will help to
clarify the attractions of absolutist constitutivism, and also to bring
out some questionable assumptions on which it rests.
Korsgaard is the leading contemporary advocate of the Kantian
position. In a series of influential papers and monographs, she has
sought to show that Kant’s categorical imperative articulates a neces-
sary norm of agency – a norm to which rational agents are committed
by their very exercise of agency, so that in failing to conform to it, they
have acted badly by their own lights. For present purposes, the aspect
of Korsgaard’s argument of interest is not her case forKant’s categor-
ical imperative in particular, but her general strategy for showing that
some such unconditional normative requirement holds.
The strategy, very roughly, is to argue that, unless some uncondi-
tional normative requirement holds, there can be no distinction
between an exercise of agency, attributable to the agent herself, and
the mere expression of forces operative in a person, producing behavior
thatdoesnot constitute the agent’sdeterminingherself todo something.
To exercise agency, Korsgaard proposes, is to determine oneself to
perform some actA for the sake of some endE. (She reserves the term
‘action’ for this form of endeavor – doingA for E – and uses the term
‘act’ to refer to the thing done – do A). But if an agent is to exercise
agency in this sense, she argues, there must be a basis for distinguish-
ing the agent’s determining to do A for E from some mere impulse
determining her to do A for E. If some impulse in the agent, say an
irresistible urge for E, determines her to do A for E, then she does
not determine her action; rather, she is determined to act in a certain
way by a force whose efficacy does not depend on her will. There is,
however, a basis for distinguishing the agent’s determining her own
action from her being non-agentially determined to act only if the
agent can consider the question whether to doA for E. And this con-
sideration, Korsgaard goes on to argue, must take the form of asses-
sing whether this ‘maxim’ – do A for E – can be willed as a universal
law. So, in effect, to be capable of exercising agency at all, an agent
must be capable of assessing whether her maxims satisfy the categor-
ical imperative, and in representing herself as choosing to perform a
certain action, she represents herself as taking her maxim to meet
this test.
This line of reasoning would be interesting, I think, even if its final
stepswere judgedunsuccessful.Whateverwe thinkofKorsgaard’s con-
cluding argument (which I have not tried to reconstruct) for the claim
that agents are always already assessing their actions by the categorical
imperative, I think we should be intrigued by her strategy for showing
that agency requires, not just the capacity to take reasonable means to
one’s ends, but the capacity tomake some sort of unconditional rational
assessment of one’s action as a whole (one’s doingA for E). Korsgaard
takes this point by itself to rule out a Humean conception of practical
reason. Humeans hold that the proper function of practical reason is
simply to consider what means should be taken to realize given ends.
But according toKorsgaard, ‘the instrumental principle (i.e., the prin-
ciple that one should take the necessary means to one’s ends) cannot
stand alone’: if there were no supporting rational commitment to
pursue some end E, there would be no basis for a distinction between
the agent’s failing to conform to the instrumental principle (by not
taking the necessary means to achieve E) and her simply ceasing to
pursue E.10 For a principle to be a genuine norm governing action,
Korsgaard holds, it must be possible for an agent to fail to conform
to this principle. In particular, if the instrumental principle is to be
genuinely normative, it must be possible for an agent who is pursuing
E to know that doingA is necessary for achievingE, and yet fail to doA.
But if the agent is not rationally committed to pursuingE, then her not
taking what she knows to be the necessary means to E does not exhibit
any rational failure, for nothing about the agent’s situation requires that
she should pursue E at all. Korsgaard concludes that, in the absence of
some sort of rational commitment to the pursuit of particular ends,
there is no such thing as the agent’s being instrumentally irrational.
10 ChristineM.Korsgaard, ‘TheNormativity of Instrumental Reason’,
in Ethics and Practical Reason, 251.
This result, shemaintains, is just anothermanifestationof thepoint that
the applicability of the concept of agency requires a distinction between
the agent’s determining herself to action and something else determin-
ing this:
[Hume] has no resources for distinguishing a person’s ends from what she ac-
tually pursues. Another way to put the same point… is to say that Hume has
no resources for distinguishing the activity of the person herself from the oper-
ation of beliefs, desires, and other forces in her.11
I’mdescribing these arguments because I think they have undeniable
appeal. There is something attractive in the thought that agency re-
quires determining oneself to act in pursuit of a certain end, as
opposed to being passively determined to action; and it seems plaus-
ible that, if we could not regard certain ends as rational to pursue, the
question whether it is rational to take certain means would not have
the sort of significance it has for us. Nevertheless, I believe that
each of these ideas is in fact question-begging in the context of the
debate with anti-Kantians. Explaining why this is so will bring out
the need for an alternative account of the appeal of Korsgaard’s argu-
ments, one that does not require interpreting them as stating what
must be so where there is action at all.
Consider the first idea: that agency requires determining oneself to
act in pursuit of a certain end. In arguing from this conception of
agency to the existence of unconditional requirements, Korsgaard
presupposes that what an agent must determine herself to do is of
the form: do A for E.12 This is to conceive of the object of choice,
not simply as an act (do A), but a certain principle of action (do A
for E). But this is precisely what anti-Kantians should not admit.
On their view, the only necessary requirement on agency is the con-
ditional requirement that, given a certain end, the agent should take
appropriate means. Hence they should not admit that agents, simply
as such, face rationally-assessable choices about whether to act on a
certain principle; for this is tantamount to admitting that agents,
simply as such, face rationally-assessable choices about whether to
pursue certain ends. Anti-Kantians should admit only that, given
the ends an agent is in fact going after, she faces the choice whether
to take certain means. On this view, the agent’s end does not fall
11 Ibid., 233.
12 Thus Korsgaard takes it to be uncontentious that ‘what the will
chooses is, strictly speaking, actions’, where an ‘action’ is a doing of A for
E. That this assumption is contentious has been discussed by Millgram in
‘Pluralism about Action’, though he interprets its significance very differ-
ently than I do.
within the scope of her choice – or at any rate, the sheer fact that she
is an agent does not entail that it do so. And so, if Korsgaard’s argu-
ment depends on assuming that the object of choice is what she calls
‘action’ – doing A for E – then it takes for granted the very point in
dispute. But once this assumption is dropped, there is no direct
route to the conclusion that an agent whose ends simply appear and
disappear as the result of forces operative in her does not determine
herself to act. After all, on the anti-Kantian view, the requirement
of self-determination applies, not to the agent’s principle of doing
A for E, but only to her act of doing A, and no reason has been
given to think that the agent’s doing A (rather than, say, B, which
she judges to be possible but less conducive to achieving E) cannot
be self-determined.
Turn now to the second idea: that, if an agent could not regard
certain ends as rational to pursue, the question whether it is rational
to take necessary means would lose significance for her. Korsgaard’s
argument for this presupposes a certain conception of the role that
the instrumental principle must play in our practical thought. As we
have seen, she assumes that it must be possible for an agent to be pur-
suing E, and know (or at least believe) that doing A is necessary for E,
and yet not do A. Only this, she thinks, would be a genuine failure to
respect the instrumental principle, and only a principle that an agent
can fail to respect can be a genuine norm of agency. But again, this
is precisely what anti-Kantians should not admit. On their view, an
agent, considered simply as such, is subject only to the norm that,
(IPAntiK) Given the ends she is pursuing, she should: take the necessary means.
Here the ‘should’ has narrow scope: it applies only to her taking the
means that are in fact necessary to achieve her ends.13 Contrast this
with a wide-scope reading of the instrumental principle:
13 The scope contrast I am drawing here should not be confused with
the more familiar contrast between a wide scope reading of practical
norms on which they are of the form:
(WS) It ought to be the case that, if p, then the agent does A.
and a narrow scope reading on which their form is:
(NS) If p, then it ought to be the case that the agent does A.
Korsgaard holds that fundamental norms of practical rationality cannot be
formulated in the manner of (WS), on pain of their not being genuinely
practical norms (‘The Activity of Reason’, Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Association 83(2) (2009): 27–29.) It is less clear
whether she would accept formulations along the lines of (NS) or hold
(IPK) The agent should: take the necessary means to her ends.
Let it be granted that a principle can only count as a genuine norm of
agency if it is possible for an agent to violate it. For an agent to violate
(IPK), she would need to choose not to take the necessary means to her
ends; and this plausibly requires her believing of some act A that it is
necessary for achieving her end E and yet not doing A. But for an
agent to violate (IPAntiK), she would need only to be pursuing a
certain end E and choose not to do A, which is in fact necessary for
E. To impose the additional requirement that she should do this
while believing that doing A is necessary to achieve E is to require,
not only that she should be capable of voluntarily acting in a
manner that is (in fact) not conducive to her end, but that she
should be capable of voluntarily flouting the instrumental principle
itself – knowing it to apply and yet choosing not to conform to it.
But this is again tantamount to assuming the very point in dispute.
Anti-Kantians simply should not admit that rational agency requires
being ‘governed by the instrumental principle’ in a sense that would
require the possibility of this specific sort of violation. For on their
view, the only necessary object of practical reason is: whether to do
such-and-such, not whether to conform to the principle that requires
doing such-and-such.
The upshot of these criticisms is that Korsgaard has no non-ques-
tion-begging argument for the conclusion that any agent, simply as
an agent, is subject to some unconditional normative requirement.
Her arguments apply, at best, only to a certain form of agent, one
capable of choosing to do A for E – choosing to act on a certain prin-
ciple, as I have put it. How serious a setback is this for Korsgaard’s
Kantian constitutivism? It is a decisive defeat if the Kantian project
must be to derive unconditional normative requirements from the
very idea of agency; but is it obvious that Korsgaard’s arguments
are of interest only if they meet this condition? Whatever may be
true of agents simply as such, it seems attractive to hold that
human agents are characteristically capable of choosing to act on
principles. At any rate, I take myself to be capable of making such
out for something else altogether. But whatever the outcome of this dispute,
there remains the question whether the scope of the instrumental principle is
wide or narrow in the sense I have distinguished: whether it says that we are
rationally required to take the means to our ends, or only that, given certain
ends, we are rationally required to take certain means. My claim is that, with
respect to this latter contrast, Korsgaard’s argument presupposes the wide
reading.
choices – and I take myself to have this capacity, not on the basis of
self-observation, but by reflection on my very ability to understand
and deliberate about whether it is right to act on the principle: do
A for E. I don’t claim any special success in subjecting my principles
of action to such scrutiny: I do not often rise to this level of reflection,
nor do I claim any distinction in disciplining my action by its results.
But I know myself at least to be capable of this sort of self-scrutiny:
embarrassment over doing so only here and there expresses a pre-
sumption that I could do better.14 And to this extent, it seems that
Korsgaard’s reflections – to the extent that they are cogent – might
after all get a grip on me even if they do not get a grip on all conceiv-
able agents.
3.2 Kant’s anti-Kantianism
Contemporary Kantians like Korsgaard commonly suppose their
burden is to show that any conceivable rational agent must accept
the categorical imperative as a norm governing her action. One indi-
cation that this might not be necessary to comprehend vindication of
comes from the historical Kant. For whatever his view might have
been at the time of writing the Groundwork, by the time he wrote
the Critique of Practical Reason, he plainly held that being subject
to the moral law is known to us, not as a consequence of some more
basic premise about the general nature of rational agency, but as a
basic fact of reason – something known to us in virtue of having the
sort of power of practical reason that we actually have, together
with the capacity to reflect self-consciously on exercises of this
power. Indeed, in the Religion, Kant says explicitly that the
concept of moral ‘personality’ (i.e. the concept of ‘a rational and at
the same time responsible being’) is not contained in the concept of
14 Compare Kant’s famous remark on how our very recognition of the
moral law implies a recognition of our own practical capacities: ‘Ask
[someone] whether, if his prince demanded, on the threat of the… prompt
penalty of death, that he give false testimony against an honest man whom
the prince would like to ruin under specious pretenses, he might consider
it possible to overcome his love of life, however great it may be. He will
perhaps not venture to assure us whether or not he would overcome that
love, be he must concede without hesitation that doing so would be possible
for him. He judges, therefore, that he can do something because he is con-
scious that he ought to do it’. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical
Reason, trans. Mary J. Gregor, (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5:30.
‘humanity’ (i.e., the concept of ‘a living and at the same time rational
being’):
[F]rom the fact that a being has reason, it does not at all follow that, simply by
virtue of representing its maxims as suited to universal legislation, this reason
contains a faculty of determining the power of choice unconditionally, and
hence to be ‘practical’ on its own; at least, not so far as we can see. The most ra-
tional being of this world might still need certain incentives, coming to him
from the objects of inclination, to determine his power of choice. He might
apply the most rational reflection to these objects – about what concerns their
greatest sum as well as the means for attaining the goal determined through
them –without thereby even suspecting the possibility of such a thing as the ab-
solutely imperative moral law which announces to be itself an incentive, and,
indeed, the highest incentive. Were this law not given to us from within, no
amount of subtle reasoning on our part would produce it or win our power of
choice over to it.15
Kant here appears to admit quite unequivocally that a merely
Humean power of practical reason (i.e. one that can and should
only reason instrumentally, and perhaps prudentially, on the basis
of given sensible inclinations) is conceptually possible, or in any
case that we cannot rule it out. If so, the existence of unconditional
practical norms cannot be demonstrated by any analytical-deductive
argument beginning simply from the idea of a living being with the
power of practical reason. Nevertheless, Kant holds that we actual
humans know ourselves to be, not merely Humean agents, but
morally responsible persons, on the basis of a law ‘given to us from
within’ – namely, the moral law implicit in our very understanding
of the unconditional practical ‘ought’.16
Kant’s position suggests the possibility of a non-absolutist consti-
tutivism: one that recognizes the possibility of more than one form of
agency, and that seeks to vindicate our subjection to unconditional
normative requirements by showing them to belong constitutively
15 Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and
Other Writings, trans. George Di Giovanni (Cambridge University Press,
1998), 6:26.
16 Op. cit. note 145:31. This is commonly supposed to reflect a change
in Kant’s position. For doubts see Stephen Engstrom,The Form of Practical
Knowledge (Harvard University Press, 2009). Sergio Tenenbaum,
‘Speculative Mistakes and Ordinary Temptations: Kant on
Instrumentalist Conceptions of Practical Reason’, History of Philosophy
Quarterly 20(2) (2003), 203–23 and ‘The Idea of Freedom and Moral
Cognition in Groundwork III’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
84(3) (2012), 555–89.
to our specific form of agency, rather than to rational agency
simpliciter.
3.3. Humean absolutism
The possibility of such a pluralist constitutivism is routinely over-
looked, not only by contemporary Kantians aiming to defend uncon-
ditional normative requirements, but also by their anti-Kantian
opponents. To take just one example, consider17 which begins by
arguing that
1. Any rational agent, simply as such, is subject to the instrumental principle.
For, he argues, unless an agent’s practical reasoning is governed by
this principle, she is incapable of drawing any practical inferences
from given aims to determinate actions, and if she is incapable of
drawing practical inferences, then nothing can count as a practical
reason for her. He then argues that
2. The instrumental principle is the only necessary principle of practical reason.
For, he holds, no other putative principle of practical rationality
shares the unquestionable necessity of the instrumental principle: it
makes no sense to ask for a reason to take the means to your ends,
whereas this question at least makes sense for any other putative prac-
tical requirement. But it is plausible that
3. If compliance with morality were demanded by practical reason, this would
require the existence of an unconditional, non-instrumental principle of prac-
tical reason.
Thus, Dreier concludes, Hume is vindicated:
4. Practical reason does not demand compliance with morality.
Without disputing any premise of this argument, I want to note an
ambiguity in its use of the phrase ‘practical reason’. It might mean
either practical reason, considered simply as such or practical
reason as we know it. The considerations Dreier offers in favor of
premise (2) – granting their cogency for the sake of argument – estab-
lish this premise only if ‘practical reason’ is read in the former way:
they establish that no further principle is required by the very idea
of a capacity to reason practically. But the conclusion, (4), is a
17 Dreier, ‘Humean Doubts About the Practical Justification of
Morality’.
vindication of Hume only if ‘practical reason’ is read in the latter way,
as a claim about our actual power of practical reason – for surely
Hume meant to claim, not just that a Humean agent is conceptually
possible, but that we are actually Humean agents, whose reason is and
ought to be a slave to our passions.
4. The possibility of pluralism
To assume that a vindication of Hume can be inferred from Dreier’s
premises is, in effect, to assume that if only the instrumental principle
is necessitated by the very concept of a capacity to reason practically,
then the instrumental principle is the only principle that can belong
necessarily to a capacity for practical reason. It is to assume that if no
further requirement of practical rationality is conceptually necessary,
then no further requirement of practical rationality is actually pos-
sible. This is to overlook the possibility of a pluralist constitutivism,
one which acknowledges that a Humean form of practical reason is
conceptually possible, and thus that no unconditional practical re-
quirements can be derived from an analysis of the very concept of a
rational agent, but which maintains that other, richer forms of
agency are also possible.
Dreier does not give an argument to rule out this possibility: he
simply assumes that the debate over constitutivism is a debate
about whether there are practical requirements to which all conceiv-
able rational agents are subject. And though I cannot argue the point
here, I think this holds true also of other prominent contemporary
anti-Kantians: they pass from arguments for the claim that
Humean rational agents are conceptually possible to conclusions
about what practical reason demands of us, by way of an uncritical as-
sumption that any constitutivist vindication of practical requirements
must ground those requirements in the very idea of a rational agent.18
This absolutist assumption, shared by contemporary Kantians and
anti-Kantians, gives their dispute the appearance of a conflict in
which only one side can be correct. But once we recognize the possi-
bility of a pluralist constitutivism, we can see that each side might be
right about something significant. The anti-Kantians might be right
that the very concept of a capacity to act for reasons does not imply
any further requirement beyond the instrumental principle, while
the Kantians might be right that our actual capacity to act for
18 See, for example, Smith, ‘The Magic of Constitutivism’, Street,
‘Coming to Terms with Contingency’, Vogler, Reasonably Vicious.
reasons takes a form that implies the existence of unconditional prac-
tical norms. So long as neither side frames its point in absolutist
terms, their views are consistent.
5. The problem of inescapability
If the discussion of the last section is sound, a pluralist position – one
that allows for the possibility of multiple forms of agency, each con-
stitutively subject to its own characteristic requirements of practical
rationality – is a dialectically attractive option that is mostly over-
looked in contemporary debates over constitutivism. This calls for
explanation: if this sort of position is available and attractive, why
is it not considered?
To see a reason for this neglect, it will help to consider an influen-
tial criticism of the constitutivist program. This criticism brings out
that, on some ways of understanding the thesis that being subject to
certain norms is ‘constitutive of being an agent’, this thesis proves
too flimsy to support the metaethical results that constitutivists
hope to derive from it. It can seem that the only way to avoid this
sort of flimsiness is to embrace Absolutism, Conceptualism, and
Formalism. I conjecture that it is some – perhaps tacit – recognition
of this difficulty that prevents the pluralist alternative from coming
into view. But in fact, I will argue, we can avoid the difficulty
without embracing these commitments.
The kind of objection to constitutivism I have in mind is exempli-
fied by David Enoch’s much discussed essay ‘Agency, Shmagency’.
He begins by noting that a main attraction of constitutivism, as it is
standardly presented, is that it would clarify why certain normative
requirements on action are rationally authoritative – why a rational
agent cannot coherently ask, concerning such norms, ‘Why should
I care?’ For, constitutivists hold, since the question ‘Why should I
care?’ is asked by an agent considering how to act, and since the rele-
vant norms are implied in the very idea of agency, there can be no
genuine question about whether, in the relevant sense of ‘should’,
these norms should be followed. But, Enoch objects, this sort of
account of the authority of certain norms simply takes it for
granted that one should strive to be what ‘an agent’ ought to be. If
being an agent requires conformity to certain norms to which many
people do not actually seek to conform, then it seems coherent to
ask ‘Why should I be an agent?’ But if this question is coherent,
then any norms implied by the idea of agency appear to apply to a
given subject only conditionally, insofar as she has reason to be an
agent. In the absence of such a reason, it is rationally permissible for
her to say ‘Agency, Shmagency!’And even if there is such a reason, it
presumably cannot itself be grounded in norms implied by the very
idea of agency, since it is supposed to ground the applicability of
those very norms. So in either case, the constitutivist project of
grounding the authority of certain norms in the nature of agency fails.
Now, it is not clear that Enoch’s question, ‘Why should I be an
agent?’, is genuinely coherent. Constitutivists generally reply that
being an agent is not an attribute that a subject can coherently
choose to have or not to have. I am an agent, not by choice, but
simply by virtue of my nature as a free, self-determining being.
Any choice I make will inevitably be the choice of an agent. So, argu-
ably, the question ‘Why should I be an agent?’ presupposes the pos-
sibility of a standpoint that no deliberating subject can actually
occupy. If this is right, then any norms implied by the very idea of
agency are not just conditionally binding; they are binding on any
subject who can confront the question what to do, and the constitu-
tivist project is vindicated.
This reply, however, may seem to be available only to a constituti-
vist who relies in his argument on the most abstract andminimal con-
ception of agency. For it may seem that being an agent is an
inescapable attribute of a subject who confronts the question what
to do only if ‘being an agent’ means nothing more than: being such
as to be capable of confronting the question what to do. After all,
given any richer conception of agency, it is not a necessary truth
that a subject who can act for reasons must be ‘an agent’ in this
sense. So given any richer conception of agency, Enoch’s question
may seem to regain its grip: why should one strive to be ‘an agent’
in this richer sense, if it is possible to deliberate, choose, and act
without being such a thing? But if Enoch’s question gets a grip,
then Enoch’s dilemma for constitutivism applies. So it appears that
a principled constitutivism must aim to ground whatever norms it
seeks to vindicate in the very concept of agency, a concept that
applies to any conceivable subject capable of acting for reasons.
And then a pluralist constitutivism is obviously unacceptable: for if
a certain form of agency is supposed to be, not the one-and-only
form required in any agent capable of acting for reasons, but one of
a plurality of possible forms, then the normative requirements
implied by that form will be open to Enoch’s challenge, and so the
relevant form of agency will not provide the basis for a constitutivist
vindication of those norms.
I suspect that a more-or-less explicit concern with heading off such
a challenge underlies the widespread assumption that a satisfying
constitutivism must accept Absolutism. Enoch offers an elaborate
version of the challenge, but the basic idea is simple.
Constitutivists seek to show that certain norms are unconditionally
required by observing that anything you choose to do will be an
action, and arguing that any action, as such, is subject to certain nor-
mative requirements. But, as Millgram puts it,
The point that anything you do will be an action is likely to be granted only on
the thinnest and most minimal reading of what an action is.19
Hence it appears that a satisfying constitutivism must assume only
the thinnest and most minimal reading of what an action is. But a
pluralist constitutivist would be someone who accepts that there are
several possible forms of agency, no one of which is necessarily exhib-
ited by all subjects who can act for reasons. Hence a pluralist consti-
tutivist would seem to deprive herself of the cornerstone on which
constitutivist arguments are built: the premise that, necessarily, if
you act at all, you must do something that is subject to such-and-
such normative requirements.
I have described this challenge because I think it provides an intel-
ligible motivation for the assumption that an acceptable constituti-
vism must be Absolutist. But while this motivation strikes me as
intelligible, I think it actually rests on an unsound inference.
It is true that, if there is a plurality of forms of agency, then no one
form of agency is necessarily exhibited by all subjects who can act for
reasons. Properly understood, however, the constitutivist project
need not rely on the claim that there is a form of agency that is neces-
sarily exhibited by any subject who acts for reasons. The constituti-
vists’ claim need not be:
The Form: There is a form of agency such that, necessarily, any subject who
acts for reasons will exhibit that form of agency.
It might rather be:
MyForm:For any subject who acts for reasons, there is some one single form of
agency such that, necessarily, that subject will exhibit that form of agency.
On the latter reading, the starting-point of the constitutivist argu-
ment is not the claim that a certain form of agency is inescapable
full stop, but that for a given subject, a certain form of agency is in-
escapable. If this is true, then that agent is inescapable subject to
whatever normative requirements are implied by that form of
agency, whether or not it is possible for there to be other kinds of
19 ‘Pluralism About Action’, 12.
agents subject to other kinds of norms. And that, in effect, is the plur-
alist’s claim: not that there are norms to which any agent, simply qua
agent, is subject, but that we, qua agents of the kindwe are, are subject
to certain specific norms.
Such a pluralist position will be defensible to the extent that it can
be shown that there is a form of agency that is inescapable for us: not
an optional refinement that we might choose to exhibit or not to
exhibit, but a kind of self-determination that we, being the kind of
beings we are, cannot fail to exhibit in our actions. If this condition
were satisfied, then we could not coherently ask Enoch’s question
concerning this form of agency, even if other forms of agency were
logically possible.
6. Reason and will: an Aristotelian approach
The preceding section concluded with an abstract description of a
possible pluralist constitutivism. But could there actually be a pos-
ition that met this description? Could we acknowledge that certain
fundamental practical norms apply, not to every conceivable agent,
but only to agents of a certain form, and yet maintain that, for
agents of this form, these norms have an inescapable authority? I
think Aristotle’s ethics shows the possibility of such a position, and
clarifies some of its crucial structural features. My aim in this final
section is to sketch – very briefly and programmatically – a reading
of Aristotle’s ethics along these lines.
It will help to begin by recalling four very familiar features of
Aristotelian ethics. First, Aristotle’s approach is founded on an
appeal to the idea that human beings, as human beings, have a
proper work or a function.20 This, he holds, is what gives determinacy
to the inquiry into what human happiness consists in, and thus into
how we ought to live. The idea of a human function sounds alien
to modern ears, but it becomes clear as the argument proceeds that
what Aristotle has in mind is that human beings possess a specific
kind of soul, one characterized by certain vital powers or principles,
and chiefly, the power of reason. The function of man is to live
(and thus to exercise the full complement of these powers) in a
manner governed by reason, and Aristotle infers that, since the
good of a thing is determined by its function, the human good
20 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics: Translation, Introduction,
Commentary, ed. Sarah Broadie, trans. Christopher Rowe (Oxford
University Press, 2002) I.7.
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consists in the excellent performance of those activities that belong to
a reason-governed life.
This first point dictates the structure of Aristotelian ethics, but it
does not yet determine its content. Although the main divisions of
Aristotle’s investigation are settled by his conception of the structure
of the human soul, what falls within these divisions consists – and this
is the second point – of an enumeration of various specific virtues.
Aristotle makes no attempt to derive these virtues from his abstract
characterization of the human function, and this has seemed to
some commentators to make the initial appeal to function superflu-
ous. This reaction, however, depends on a questionable view of the
role that the notion of function is supposed to play. Apparently it is
not supposed to provide a basis from which to derive particular
virtues; Aristotle seems to regard it, rather, as a crucial clarification
of what sort of thing a virtue is supposed to be. We might say that
it is not the principle of their discovery, but the account of their meta-
physical basis – of the kind of fact which can make it the case that a
certain putative virtue is a genuine and not a merely pretended one.
Third, Aristotle presents his treatise on ethics as addressed, not to
people needing to be convinced that the virtues he enumerates are
virtues at all, but rather to those who have been ‘properly brought
up’, brought up in such a way that they already are attracted to
these ways of living.21 Aristotle thus does not seek to address the
sort of moral skeptic that Plato confronts in the person of
Thrasymachus or Callicles: he merely develops a systematic frame-
work in which to clarify and understand the unity of various goods
to which his audience is already unreflectively drawn. And this
modesty of justificatory ambition seems closely connected to
certain other well-known features of Aristotle’s view: his insistence
that we should not expect the basic principles of ethics to admit of
precise codification;22 his likening of the understanding of the virtu-
ous person to a capacity for accurate perception rather than for sound
reasoning;23 and his identification of the case-by-case judgment of
the practically wise person, rather than some abstract formula, as
the standard of right action.24 All these features of Aristotle’s view
confirm the observation that he does not expect his general account
of the human good to supply the principle of a non-question




24 Ibid., II.6, 1107a1-2, VI.12, 1144a34.
life, or of the right thing to do in particular circumstances. This is not
to suggest that he would regard such questions as not open to argu-
ment, but he does not seem to aspire to offer a certain sort of founda-
tional argument about such matters.
Finally, the fourth point: although theNicomachean Ethics seeks to
give a general account of human virtue, Aristotle is notoriously
willing to contemplate the idea that different virtues are appropriate
to a man, awoman, a child, and a slave.Whatever else wemaymake of
this, it indicates at least that Aristotle thinks of his official system of
virtues as characterizing, not norms applying to all possible agents
possessing a rational soul, but norms appropriate to a specific sort
of rational agent (namely, the patriarchs of free families living to-
gether in a political community). Moreover, in a striking passage,
Aristotle remarks that, to the extent that we may think of other
species of animals as having practical wisdom, it will be right to say
that there is ‘a different philosophic wisdom about the good of each
species.’25 The apparent implication is that the practical wisdom he
characterizes in the Ethics is, not the only possible form of practical
wisdom, but the kind pertaining specifically to human beings. We
could express the significance of this by saying that, were there
another species of rational animal, the fundamental principles of its
practical thought might be quite different from those that govern
ours. Perhaps the mode of excellent activity that characterized its
reason-governed life would not require courage (think of a rational
rabbit); perhaps it might not even be a specifically social rational
animal, needing the virtue of justice. At any rate, our practical
wisdom is the sound capacity for choice of a certain specific form of
agent.26
I hope these descriptions of familiar aspects of Aristotle’s position
resonate with the case made earlier for the possibility of a pluralist
constitutivism. Aristotle’s ethics is evidently open to the possibility
of pluralism, and he certainly does not aim to deduce his system of
fundamental norms of action from an analysis of rational agency as
25 Ibid., VI.7 1141a32-3.
26 Michael Thompson brought the passage to my attention. Here and
throughout I have been influenced by Thompson’s work. See his ‘Forms
of Nature: ‘First’, ‘Second’, ‘Living’, ‘Rational’ and ‘Phronetic’’ (unpub-
lished). Also see the following: Matthias Haase, ‘Life and Mind’, in The
Freedom of Life: Hegelian Perspectives, ed. Thomas Khurana (Berlin:
August Verlag, 2013), 69–109; Jennifer Whiting, ’Hylomorphic Virtue:
Cosmology, Embryology, and Moral Development in Aristotle’
(unpublished).
such. He does not aim to deduce these norms at all, but simply (i) to
give a clarifying description of them to people who already possess an
incipient appreciation of their importance, and (ii) to articulate the
metaphysical conditions that make it possible for this description to
be sound or unsound.
In what sense is this a constitutivist position? I noted earlier that
Aristotle’s view can be regarded as constitutivist inasmuch as it
seeks to ground the fact that we ought to act in certain ways in what
we essentially are – where ‘what we essentially are’ includes, not
just that we are rational agents, but that we are specifically human
agents. It may seem, however, that this is a constitutivism in name
only; for if it does not seek to show that the relevant sort of constitu-
tion has inescapable practical authority over those who bear it, and
does not seek to deduce specific practical norms from this constitu-
tion, in what sense can it claim to ground these norms in our
constitution?
At this point, it is important to recall what made the constitutivist
approach attractive in the first place. It was, I take it, not its deductive
or analytical aspirations per se, but rather what the relevant deduc-
tions and analyses were supposed to secure: an account of the
source of fundamental practical norms that shows how they can be
objective but not alien to our will, and that elucidates why their
claim to authority over us is not one we can just shrug off, but one
to which we are always already committed in the very exercise of
our power to choose and act. The basic attraction of constitutivism,
then, lies not in its being specially well placed to prove that certain
fundamental practical norms apply to us, but in its giving an espe-
cially attractive account of what makes it the case that certain funda-
mental practical norms apply to us. Or to put it another way: the
constitutivist’s real contribution to metaethics consists, not in offer-
ing an account of the epistemology of normativity that wouldmake its
claims especially indubitable, but in offering an account of the meta-
physics of normativity that would make the nature and authority of
these norms particularly transparent.
It seems to me that Aristotle’s approach to ethics can lay claim to
these advantages of constitutivism in spite of its pluralist, non-analyt-
ical, non-deductivist character. What it offers is not a picture of how
we can reason to the relevant practical norms; but that is not the basic
sense in which the grounding of these norms needs clarification.
What needs clarification is what sort of thing a ‘fundamental practical
norm’might be such that it could have the relevant combination of ob-
jectivity, authority, and capacity to move the will. Aristotle sketches a
metaphysics that clarifies this by explaining the relation of the relevant
norms to what we essentially are. His account aims to explain why,
being the kind of agents we are, and receiving the kind of upbringing
that such agents receive in favorable circumstances, we come to find
the relevant norms primitively compelling – and also why (i.e., what
makes it the case that) we are right to do so. A practically wise
Aristotelian agent does not reason from his being (or being committed
to being) a human being to specific norms of how he ought to live. His
being a human being need not itself come into his practical thought at
all, except incidentally. He faces no question about why he should be a
human being, or do what human beings, as such, ought to do. It is
enough that he is – essentially – a human being, and that this explains
why it is sound for the goodness of certain specific ways of living and
acting to figure primitively in his thinking about what to do and how
to live.
I cannot develop the point here, but I suspect this aspect of
Aristotle’s ethics reflects much more basic features of his metaphy-
sics. His metaphysics, famously, is hylomorphism: the view that
the being of the most basic natural beings (natural substances) con-
sists of a certain type of form being realized in a certain sort of
matter. The essence of a natural substance consists, not of its mere
form, but of such-and-such-a-form-in-such-and-such matter. In ap-
plication to human beings, I would argue, this means that our essence
is not simply: rational being, or rational animal, but rather: rational-
animal-subject-to-such-and-such (specifically human) conditions.
And our essence is that sort of being in the absence of we would
not be at all. Hence it is not a mode of being one of us might fail to
have. The consequence of this point, when brought together with
Aristotle’s project of explaining good in terms of essence, is that
the measure of goodness that flows from our essence is not one that
one of us can coherently reject, being what we are. This is not to
say that the relevant measure of goodness is unquestionable, but
that there is a true and intelligibly well-founded answer to such ques-
tions, an answer grounded in what can be called our constitution. We
need not accept the substance of Aristotle’s ethics to see the structural
appeal of such a position. Why should a philosophically significant
form of constitutivism claim anything more than this?
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